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Abstract
With more than 400,000 trust evaluations, we examine inter-population trust in the
European Union. We focus on social capital theory explanations in a context
where European inhabitants from 20 countries rate trust in the populations of 27
other European countries and in their own national population. We emphasize the
role of ethnic heterogeneity, but we extend the research by studying the importance
of the presence of specific European migrants in a country for trusting this population as
a whole. Moreover, we consider the relation with the citizen’s country and character-
istics of the trusted populations’ country. We use the European Election Studies, show-
ing that diversity is important for explaining trust in other populations and trust in one’s
own population – but opposite to what is expected by Putnam.
Keywords
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Introduction
In the discussion on the inﬂuence of ethnic heterogeneity on levels of generalized
trust, researchers have come to inconclusive results. In the US context, Putnam
(2007) shows that trust levels declined in neighbourhoods with greater heterogene-
ity. Heterogeneity aﬀects not only trust in other groups – out-groups – but, inter-
estingly, also trust in members of the in-group. Putnam concludes that diversity
reduces social solidarity and social capital in general and triggers social isolation.
Delhey and Newton (2005) corroborated the same hypothesis for predicting
cross-national levels of generalized trust: higher levels of fractionalization were
associated with lower levels of trust. In other European cross-national studies,
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however, the ﬁndings do not support the social capital thesis that ethnic diversity
decreases levels of generalized trust (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Hooghe et al., 2009).
It is in line with Putnam that, at the country level, ethnic diversity increases unfa-
vourable attitudes towards out-groups (Kunovich, 2004; Quillian, 1995) and leads
to a larger share of extreme right-wing voters (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006;
Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005). Yet it does not aﬀect outcomes that are central
to social capital theory – trusting others in general, meeting neighbours, friends or
colleagues, and helping others (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Hooghe et al., 2009).
Moreover, at the local level, researchers did not ﬁnd eﬀects of ethnic diversity.
Tolsma et al. (2009) even found the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on some measuers of
social cohesion to be opposite to Putnam’s ﬁndings. Wagner et al. (2006) found in
the German context that a larger share of migrants increases inter-ethnic contacts,
and in turn decreases negative evaluations of others.
We contribute to the debate on trust and its relation to ethnic diversity by
expanding general trust in non-speciﬁed ‘others’ to intra-Europe inter-population
trust. We aim to ﬁnd out to what extent people have trust in 27 other populations
and in their own national population. The cross-national studies of Gesthuizen
et al. (2009), Hooghe et al. (2009) and Delhey and Newton (2005) did not distin-
guish which population is trusted and analysed generalized trust. With our
approach, we assess the extent to which contextual characteristics as well as the
characteristics of the other population aﬀect trust.
Scholars have argued that mutual trust between European populations is essen-
tial for a stable European institution (Deutsch et al., 1957; Follesdal, 2004;
Handley, 1981). Attitudes and feelings of trust towards other nations are crucial
to establishing the readiness of citizens in the European Union (EU) to cooperate
in political aﬀairs and to feel solidarity with other citizens across national frontiers
(Dekker et al., 1997). In the literature on EU integration, inter-population trust has
received little attention; the focus has been on (the inﬂuence of) trust in the national
government, in the EU parliament and in other EU institutions (Christin and
Trechsel, 2002; Franklin et al., 1995; Lubbers, 2008; Mishler and Rose, 1997;
Rohrschneider, 2002). Consequently, the characteristics of other countries are
seldom included when evaluating integration. An exception is the study by
Christin and Trechsel (2002), in which the image of Switzerland’s neighbouring
countries was considered in order to explain resistance to EU membership. In the
more speciﬁc literature on European enlargement, the accession issue is related to
our questions on inter-population trust. Jones and Van der Bijl (2004) studied
propositions on how one country (the 15 EU member states of 2002) is expected
to view another (the EU candidate countries of 2002). Delhey (2005, 2007a) is one
of the exceptions, focusing extensively on inter-population trust. We follow his
research and develop it in four ways. First, we pay particular attention to various
ethnic diversity measures that have become central to studies on interpersonal trust
and that in previous studies on inter-population trust received less emphasis.
Second, we employ multi-level analyses, in which individual trust evaluations
on a set of countries are nested within respondents who are nested in countries.
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Third, because we focus on more recent data, the East European countries included
in our data set were, at the time of data collection, EU members as well – which is
of importance, because political arrangements between countries turned out to
aﬀect levels of trust (Delhey, 2007a); we incorporated East Europeans as
trust-givers. In Delhey’s study, only three East European populations were
included as trust-givers (Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland). Fourth, we
study trust not only in various other populations, but also in one’s own population.
In doing so, we follow Putnam’s (2007) constrict theory that diversity reduces not
only trust in perceived out-groups but social capital and social solidarity in general.
We question to what extent European citizens from 20 EU countries have trust
in 27 other country populations, including the population of EU candidate country
Turkey. Moreover, we ask to what extent inter-population trust and trust in one’s
own population are aﬀected by (various measures of) ethnic diversity. To answer
these questions we will take into account individual and contextual level character-
istics as well as the characteristics of the trusted population – the so-called target
population characteristics, previously studied by Jones and Van der Bijl (2004) and
Delhey (2007a).
Theories and hypotheses
Social capital is mostly measured in terms of social networks and the associated
reciprocity and trustworthiness (Putnam, 2007). Interpersonal trust is one of the
core elements of Putnam’s social capital theory (1992). Recently Pichler and
Wallace (2007) acknowledged two diﬀerent kinds of social capital, formal and
informal. Formal social capital is associated with involvement in structured civic
institutions, such as volunteering and engaging in charity. Informal social capital is
formulated as the social ties individuals have with other people. This study focuses
on informal social capital in a European context. The extent to which people put
trust in speciﬁc other European populations is expected to be dependent on the
characteristics of the country the trust-giver lives in, as well as on the characteristics
of the country of the trusted population, next to individual-level characteristics.
From previous research we know that political and economic conditions in the
trusting and the trusted country are relevant (Delhey, 2005, 2007a). In this contri-
bution we focus on the relation between diversity and trust in speciﬁc EU
populations.
Ethnic diversity and trust in other populations
From social capital theory, the general trust that people have in others depends –
next to levels of modernization – on compositional factors. When there are more
co-ethnics residing in a country, the population is expected to reach higher levels of
cohesion, which increases the level of trust. The proposition in this theory is that
people are more likely to feel at ease with people of their own group, and that
greater diversity enlarges distances between people, resulting in feelings of
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discomfort (Gesthuizen et al., 2009) and isolation (Putnam, 2007). Researchers
deduced the hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity decreases levels of trust.
In Putnam’s study, ethnic heterogeneity is measured using the Herﬁndahl index,
a measurement of ethnic fractionalization. The Herﬁndahl index is equal to 0 if the
ethnic composition of the surrounding community is composed of a single ethnic
group and equal to 1 if all ethnic groups are equally represented. Putnam (2007)
found that, at the local level, ethnic diversity did indeed decrease trust in others, as
well as trust in one’s own group. Tolsma et al. (2009) came to the opposite con-
clusion: ethnic diversity increases contacts with neighbours and tolerance of
out-group neighbours.
For our study, the international focus of Gesthuizen and colleagues (2009) is of
interest. They show that more fractionalization does not decrease social trust and,
as a result, not informal and formal social capital. Gesthuizen et al. used a measure
from Alesina et al. (2003), who provide Herﬁndahl–Hirschmann indices measuring
ethnic fractionalization for 190 countries. Following the initial ideas from
Putnam’s social capital approach, we expect that greater fractionalization reduces
the level of trust in the population of other European countries:
H1: Ethnic fractionalization hypothesis.
The level of fractionalization and the presence of migrants in a country are often
highly correlated at the country level. Conceptually, fractionalization is diﬀerent
from the percentage of immigrants in an area. In the situation where many
groups are represented equally, the level of fractionalization is at its maximum.
The presence of migrants reﬂects the experience of the native inhabitants and is
at its maximum when all others in the surrounding area have a migrant back-
ground. Although this is highly unlikely at the country level, it is relevant to
distinguish the measures. Therefore, we also hypothesize that a larger percentage
of migrants in a country reduces the level of trust in the populations of other
European countries:
H2: Ethnic concentration hypothesis.
The social capital hypothesis on ethnic concentration is similar to the dominance
hypothesis in conﬂict research (Collier, 2001; Esteban and Schneider, 2008).
When there is a group dominant in size, conﬂict is expected to be less likely to
occur. The level of dominance of the native group is the reversed function of the
presence of migrants. In this research tradition, often a dichotomy is created; for
example, Collier (2001) expected less conﬂict in societies where the dominant group
contains between 45 percent and 90 percent of the population.
In conﬂict research, another theoretical distinction has been made, that between
fractionalization and polarization (Esteban and Schneider, 2008). Polarization
refers to the extent to which ‘the population is clustered around a small number
of distant poles’ (Esteban and Schneider, 2008: 133). With a larger number of
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groups, fractionalization in a society increases, whereas polarization then
decreases. Moreover, polarization includes the information of inter-group diﬀer-
ences, usually not accounted for by fractionalization (Schneider and Wiesehomeier,
2008). The theoretical proposition is that conﬂict in a given society is at its max-
imum level when it arises out of two groups that are equal in size (Esteban and
Ray, 1999; Esteban and Schneider, 2008). Following this research, we expect that
increasing levels of polarization reduce the level of trust in the populations of other
European countries:
H3: Ethnic polarization hypothesis.
An important note here is that a society can be polarized on a multitude of
facets. Ethnic polarization is just one of the divisions in a society with which groups
can be aligned.
From previous research on generalized trust evaluations, it is found that eco-
nomic inequality is one of the strongest predictors (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).
Delhey and Newton (2005) too found that, in countries with higher levels of income
inequality, people have less trust in other people. Income inequality was also
included in the studies by Putnam (2007), Gesthuizen et al. (2009) and Van
Oorschot and Arts (2005), who all provided evidence of a negative relationship
with trust. We formulate a hypothesis in line with their ﬁnding that income inequal-
ity is negatively related to social trust:
H4: Income inequality hypothesis.
Trust in one’s own population
Putnam (2007) ﬁnds evidence for what he labelled ‘constrict theory’. This approach
implies that various facets of ethnic diversity inﬂuence not only bridging capi-
tal (ties to people who are unlike us in some important way) but also bonding
capital (ties to people who are like us in some important way) in a negative way.
The possible isolation that people experience in more diverse settings would result
in more distance not only from members perceived to be out-groups but also
from perceived in-group members. Putnam was the ﬁrst to test this hypothesis in
the US context. We will test this hypothesis in the European context. We expect
that ethnic diversity will decrease trust in other populations and also in one’s own
population:
H5:Constrict hypothesis.
To test this hypothesis we will perform a separate analysis and include the same
individual and contextual variables we expect to inﬂuence trust in other EU
populations.
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Out-group diversification
The literature discussed evaluates trust in others and in one’s own group (Putnam,
2007). The ‘others’ are evaluated as a uniform out-group, but previous research has
shown that distinctions are made between diﬀerent out-groups (Delhey, 2007a;
Jones and Van der Bijl, 2004; Linssen and Hagendoorn, 1994). These distinctions
are, among other factors, inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the out-group
(Delhey, 2005, 2007a). Even when the likelihood of distrusting a group is higher
when one distrusts an arbitrary other group, we can expect that trust in some
populations is greater than in others. To follow this reasoning on ethnic heteroge-
neity in the country in which the trust-giver lives, we expect trust to be dependent
on the presence of immigrants from the population to be trusted. From social
capital theory there is no clear expectation that a larger group of, say, Poles
would induce higher or lower levels of trust in Poles in particular. This theory
states only that a large group of Poles would induce distrust in general. From
ethnic competition theory – also discussed by Gesthuizen and colleagues (2009) –
we would expect that a larger proportion of immigrants from a speciﬁc population
would induce a greater perception of economic or cultural threat from that pop-
ulation, resulting in negative reactions to this group, including lower levels of trust
in this population:
H6: Ethnic competition hypothesis.
However, in a German study and based on EU15 interrelations, Delhey (2007b)
found that the ethnic competition hypothesis was not supported in explaining
inter-population trust in 1997.
Cultural differences and trust
One of the premises of Putnam’s thesis is that greater heterogeneity increases
distrust. Therefore, factors denoting diﬀerences between groups should evoke neg-
ative reactions and lead to less trust. Delhey (2007a) expected and found evidence
that populations from nations more similar to or less distant from the respondent’s
own country are more likely to be trusted. This argumentation is based on
Rokeach’s (1960) social-psychological belief congruence theory, which states that
there is ‘a natural tendency for people to associate with, socialize with and be more
comfortable with others having similar belief systems’ (Rokeach et al., 1960: 161;
Delhey and Newton, 2005). Delhey (2005, 2007a) found that the cultural aspects of
language and religion are relevant for evaluations of inter-population trust. We
follow this reasoning to derive the seventh hypothesis: individuals have more trust
in populations of EU countries that are culturally more similar to their own
country:
H7:Cultural distance hypothesis.
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Concerning religious similarities, we expect populations of countries with the
same dominant religion as the country in which the trust-giver lives to be more
likely to be trusted. As to language, we expect that when the language spoken in a
target country is close to the dominant language of the country of the respondent,
the population of the target country is more likely to be trusted. Greater cultural
heterogeneity or diversity in the EU will decrease mutual levels of trust.
Although, in Delhey’s (2007a) study, spatial distance did not explain levels of
trust towards other nationalities, others have found that geographical distance has
an eﬀect on attitudes towards other nations (e.g. Jones and Van der Bijl, 2004;
Linssen and Hagendoorn, 1994). Linssen and Hagendoorn (1994) showed that
geographical factors inﬂuence the stereotypes of national populations: the further
a country is away from the respondent’s own country, the less positive is the con-
tent of the stereotype of the other nation. Stereotypes and trust are two diﬀerent
concepts, but both are dimensions of out-group evaluations. Therefore, we con-
sider these ﬁndings to be applicable for examining trust as well. It is likely that
populations in countries further away from one’s own country are less likely to be
trusted because less is known about these countries and cultural diﬀerences are
expected to be larger:
H8:Geographical distance hypothesis.
One of the premises of the belief congruence approach as applied by Delhey
(2005, 2007a) is that more remote and more diﬀerent populations are less likely to
be trusted because people know less about these populations. This expectation is
also derived from contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Here,
the opposite of ethnic competition theory is expected: it proposes that the increased
presence of a group results in increased contact opportunities. Contact would
reduce stereotypes and increase levels of trust. We expect that the more people
in a society are unfamiliar with a country(’s population), the more likely people are
to distrust that population:
H9a: ‘Unknown is not trusted’ hypothesis.
Moreover, we expect that the cultural distance and geographical distance eﬀects




To test our hypotheses, we used the European Election Study of 2004 (EES 2004).
The EES 2004 included questions mirroring the academic debate on the
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possibilities of a legitimate and democratic European policy. The data address
three dimensions of democratic legitimacy: identity, representation and perfor-
mance. The part of EES 2004 used for this study was the identity dimension.
European citizens have to trust each other before they experience a sense of belong-
ing to one and the same European community and experience one European iden-
tity (EES, 2004). For this reason, a question on trust between populations of
the EU was included. Such a question had previously been included in the
Eurobarometer. However, the trust question has not been included in the
Eurobarometer since 1997. The EES surveys were conducted in 25 countries, includ-
ing East European countries; the two newest members of the EU, Romania and
Bulgaria, were not yet included. The total number of participants included in EES
2004 was 28,861. The EES is a sample of voters eligible for the European elections.
Consequently, extra-EU migrants were excluded from the sample. The question on
trust in other European populations was asked in 20 countries. The trust question
was not included in the surveys for Belgium, Great Britain, Lithuania, Malta and
Sweden. In Estonia, the trust question for the own population was not included. The
gender division for the whole study was 52 percent male and 48 percent female. The
average age of the respondents was 47.5 years.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is trust in European Union or candidate populations.
The question asked was: ‘Now I would like to ask you a question about how
much trust you have in people from various countries. Can you please tell me
for each, whether you have a lot of trust in them or not very much trust. If you
do not know a country well enough, just say so and I will go on to the next.’ The
listed populations in the questionnaire are Austrians, Belgians, British, Bulgarians,
Cypriots, Czechs, Danes, Dutch, Estonians, Finns, French, Germans, Greek,
Hungarians, Irish, Italians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Luxembourgers, Maltese,
Poles, Portuguese, Romanians, Slovaks, Slovenes, Spaniards, Swedes and Turks.
The answer categories for the dependent variable are ‘yes’, having trust (1), or ‘no’,
not having trust (0). Respondents who said that they did not know the population
or did not know whether they trusted the population or not were excluded from the
analyses. However, we used this information to test our hypothesis on familiarity
with a population.
Measurements of ethnic diversity
We used three measurements of ethnic diversity that are commonly employed in
international research but are rarely compared: ﬁrst, fractionalization; second,
ethnic concentration; and, third, ethnic polarization.
We used the measurement of fractionalization as provided by Fearon (2003) and as
used by, for example, Schneider andWiesehomeier (2008). The measurement is highly
comparable with that of Alesina et al. (2003) as used by Gesthuizen et al. (2009);
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the correlation between the measures is .90. Ethnic fractionalization is measured
diﬀerently fromPutnam (2007) but similarly toGesthuizen et al. (2009), at the country
level. The country with the highest fractionalization index is Spain, at 0.50, which
means it has the most heterogeneous population in our data set. The most homoge-
neous population is the Portuguese, with an index of 0.04. The Herﬁndahl–
Hirschmann index measures whether two people who meet randomly in the street
are from diﬀerent ethnic groups.
The second measurement of ethnic diversity is the percentage of foreigners in a
country and refers to ethnic concentration; it diﬀerentiates between native and for-
eign populations (Eurostat, 2008a).Measured in percentages, the highest proportion
of foreigners live in Luxembourg (39.0%) and the lowest in Slovakia (0.6%).
The measurement of ethnic polarization captures the extent to which larger
groups polarize societies. Whereas fractionalization indices increase with more
groups of relevant size in society, the polarization index is at its maximum (1)
when two ethnic groups in society are of equal size. We used the data on ethnic
groups constructed by Fearon (2003) and applied the formula of ethnic polariza-
tion as given by Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) and Reynal-Querol (2002). In
these contributions, both ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization were
included simultaneously in the analyses. Alesina et al. (2003) even argue that the
ethnic polarization index works best when it is highly correlated with ethnic frac-
tionalization (Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008). However, in the European con-
text of this research article, the measures correlate very strongly (.96). We therefore
will control for multicollinearity problems and, if these were present, model the
eﬀects of fractionalization only.
Income inequality
The Gini coeﬃcient is a measure of income inequality. In this study we included the
Gini coeﬃcient for every country in the study. It is lowest in Denmark (0.24) and
highest in Turkey (0.45) (Statistics Iceland, 2008).
Diversification of groups
To test the ethnic competition hypothesis we used a more detailed measurement of
the percentage of foreigners. Ethnic competition is deﬁned as the percentage of a
speciﬁc other EU or candidate nationality group present in the respondent’s country
(EuroStat, 2008a). We used the numbers from 2004. For example, in Luxembourg
there is a large Portuguese community (9%), and a considerable group of people
born in France (4%). A large group of British nationals live in Ireland (6%).
Cultural distance
Religion and language were included in our study as indicators of cultural distance.
Less cultural distance is expected between countries with similar dominant religions
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and similar languages. Countries are recognized as having the same religion when
they share the same dominant religion (CIA, 2008). When a country has two dom-
inant religions, as in for example Hungary (Roman Catholic and Protestant), this
country is connected to all other countries that are Catholic, Protestant or both.
In the data set, a country combination gets a 1 if the countries have the same
dominant religion and a 0 if they do not.
When a country’s language belongs to the same linguistic family as that spoken
in the other country, these countries are recognized as sharing the same kind
of language. The language families included in this study are German, Roman,
Baltic, Hellenic, Slavic, Turkish, Uralic and Celtic (European Commission on
Multilingualism, 2008). If in two countries the same kind of language is spoken,
the combination of these two countries gets a 1 in the data and a 0 otherwise.
Geographical distance
The geographical distance between countries was calculated for this study as the
distance in kilometres between the capital cities for each country combination. The
largest distance was between Nicosia (Cyprus) and Lisbon (Portugal); the shortest
between Bratislava (Slovakia) and Vienna (Austria). Since it is possible that two
countries are neighbouring countries but their capitals are at a great distance, we
also included a measurement of whether two countries are neighbouring countries.
When two countries are neighbouring countries, the combination gets a 1 in the
data and a 0 if they are not.
Population unfamiliarity
As mentioned in the description of the dependent variable, we used the ‘do not
know’ answers to operationalize familiarity with a population. For some popula-
tions, a large percentage of respondents indicated not knowing whether they
trusted a population. We see this as an indication of unfamiliarity with a popula-
tion. The percentage of respondents who did not know whether or not to trust a
population ranged from 1 percent of Cypriots evaluating Greeks to 60 percent of
Italians rating Lithuanians.
Control characteristics
Previous research on trust has convincingly shown the importance of national
wealth characteristics of a country and of the trusted country such as democracy
and political stability (Delhey, 2005, 2007a; Fukuyama, 1995; Paxton, 2002;
Putnam, 1992). For economic prestige we included a country’s gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita (EuroStat, 2008b), which is by far the highest for
Luxembourg (59,900), followed by Ireland (36,600) and Denmark (36,500), and
the lowest in Bulgaria (2600), Romania (2800) and Turkey (3400) (EuroStat,
2008b). As for political prestige (Delhey, 2007a), we followed the work of
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Herreros and Criado (2008), who recommend the use of the Public Institutions
Index, which includes measures of ‘independence of judiciary, the protection of
property rights, neutrality of the government in assigning public contracts, the
pervasiveness of organized crime and the pervasiveness of bribes in economic
exchange and tax payments’ (Herreros and Criado, 2008: 61). The higher the
score, the better the public institutional arrangements. The index is highest in
Denmark and lowest in Poland.
Between its foundation in 1951 and 2007 the EU expanded from 6 to 27 member
states. Delhey (2007a) provided evidence that long-term political relations between
countries increase trust between those populations. Therefore, we included the
number of shared years of EC/EU membership, as measured in 2004, in our model.
The individual-level control variables are age, gender and education. Education
was included in the questionnaire as the age when the respondent stopped full-
time education, assuming that people with a higher educational level ﬁnish their
studies later.
Analysis
Every respondent evaluated all EU (candidate) countries’ populations, and these
evaluations are expected to be aﬀected by both his or her own country’s character-
istics and the characteristics of the target population. To account for this compli-
cated data structure, we analysed the data with binary logistic regression
multi-level analyses within the program Mlwin, in which we standardized all ordi-
nal and continuous independent variables. Responses were nested within indivi-
duals, who were nested in countries. We performed two sets of analyses. First, we
estimated the eﬀects of target, country and individual characteristics on trust in
other populations (three-level model). Second, we estimated the eﬀects of country
and individual characteristics on trust in their own population (two-level model).
Results
Trust in other populations
First, we describe the trust diﬀerent populations have in each other. The average
trust among all respondents in other populations is 59 percent. Comparing the
levels of trust shown to the various countries (Table 1), we see that most
Scandinavian and North European countries are at the top, which is comparable
to ﬁndings in studies in the 1990s based on Eurobarometer data (Delhey, 2007a).
The Spanish and Portuguese are also among the 10 most trusted populations.
Larger country populations such as Germany and France are somewhat above
average; Great Britain is listed in 17th place. At the bottom of the list are generally
the East European countries and Turkey. Poles show the least trust on average in
other populations (40%). The Slovenians have the most trust on average in other
populations (75%). Trust in the respondent’s own country’s population is overall
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Table 1. Percentage of all respondents having trust in, or being unfamiliar with,
the respective country’s population and the percentage of the country’s popula-
tion having trust in their own population and in all other populations (mean

















Swedes 81 N/A N/A 18
Danes 77 97 66 21
Dutch 76 92 59 20
Finns 75 97 67 24
Luxembourgers 71 99 71 27
Belgians 71 N/A N/A 23
Spaniards 71 94 66 19
Irish 69 83 56 23
Portuguese 68 79 43 24
Austrians 67 100 61 21
Germans 67 90 67 14
French 67 89 63 17
Greek 62 86 51 24
Italians 60 71 52 17
Maltese 59 N/A N/A 35
Czechs 57 88 71 25
British 56 N/A N/A 17
Hungarians 55 85 59 27
Latvians 53 77 46 34
Estonians 52 N/A 63 31
Polish 51 73 40 22
Lithuanians 51 N/A N/A 32
Slovaks 48 83 43 28
Cypriots 46 95 43 36
Slovenians 46 95 75 31
Bulgarians 34 N/A N/A 30
Romanians 30 N/A N/A 27
Turks 24 N/A N/A 24
Total 59 89 69 24
Notes: N/A¼ not available; the particular population did not answer questions on trust or was
not included in the survey.
278 European Union Politics 11(2)
 at University of Groningen on July 4, 2012eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
higher than trust in other populations. The Austrians have the most trust in their
own population, with all respondents indicating that they trust their own popula-
tion (100%), and the Italians have the least trust (71%).
Interestingly, the Danes, Germans, Italians and Dutch have slightly more trust
in the Swedish population than in their own population. Italians also have more
trust in the Danes, Finns, Luxembourgers, Spaniards and the Dutch than in their
own population. The Dutch have more trust in the Danes and Luxembourgers than
in their own population. Germans also trust the Danes better than their own people
and the Czechs have more trust in the Finns than in their own population.
Respondents from Denmark have the most trust in another population, which is
the Swedish (98%). The Greek Cypriots have the least trust in another population,
the Turks (4%) – for historical reasons. The table also presents the percentages of
respondents who did not know (whether or not to trust) the population; we used
this as a measure of unfamiliarity with the population. Respondents are most
familiar with the Germans, scoring 14 percent on this unfamiliarity measure;
respondents are least familiar with the Cypriots (36%).
In Table 2 we present the estimated parameters of the multi-level modelling of
trust in other populations. The ﬁrst model is the intercept model, providing evi-
dence that variance components at both the country and the individual level are
highly signiﬁcant. Because of the binomial nature of the modelling, the level 1
variance (intra-individual diﬀerences between target populations) is ﬁxed at 1.
There is much more variance between individuals than between countries, which
is almost always the case in social science research. However, the country diﬀer-
ences are clearly signiﬁcant.
In the ﬁrst model, only the bivariate relations between the ethnic diversity mea-
sures and the outcome variable (trust) are given. These are actually four diﬀerent
models; therefore no variance parameters are given in this model. Both ethnic
fractionalization and ethnic polarization are positively related to trust in other
European populations, but the associations are not signiﬁcant. Nor is the eﬀect
of ethnic concentration. Only the presence of a speciﬁc group in the country sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀects trust in that group; the larger a speciﬁc group in a country, the
more likely it is that the population receives a positive evaluation – in contrast to
our ethnic competition hypothesis. There are, however, many factors we need to
control for, at both the individual and the contextual level, and these are included
in the second model.
The ﬁndings from model 2 show that people have more trust in other popula-
tions when their own country’s population is more fractionalized. We come to the
same conclusion when using the measure of ethnic polarization, which in the
European context could not be included together with fractionalization because
of problems of multicollinearity. For having trust in other populations, we have to
reject the fractionalization and polarization hypotheses as formulated on the basis
of Putnam’s work. The eﬀects of fractionalization or polarization are in the opposite
direction to that expected. Inspecting the magnitude of the eﬀect, we ﬁnd that in this
model the intercept is equal to .261. This equates to a probability of 56 percent
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relations Model 2 Model 3
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Own country characteristics
Ethnic fractionalization 0.16 0.12 0.40*** 0.15 0.35** 0.16
Ethnic polarizationa 0.15 0.12
Percentage of foreigners –0.04 0.14 –0.27 0.19 –0.22 0.21
Income inequality –0.24** 0.11 –0.18 0.12
GDP 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.20
Public Institutions Index 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13
Target population characteristics
GDP 0.34*** 0.01 0.28*** 0.01
Public Institutions Index 0.40*** 0.01 0.39*** 0.01
Relational characteristics
Percentage of target group
living in country
of trust-giver
0.06*** 0.01 –0.01 0.01 –0.04*** 0.01
Same language family 0.46*** 0.01 0.37*** 0.01
Same dominant religion 0.43*** 0.01 0.41*** 0.01
Geographical distance –0.03*** 0.01 0.01* 0.01
Neighbouring country 0.02 0.02 –0.08*** 0.02
Shared no. of years
of EU membership
0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.01
Unfamiliarity with population –0.29*** 0.01
Individual characteristics
Age –0.08*** 0.01 –0.08*** 0.01
Education 0.25*** 0.02 0.24*** 0.02
Men 0.11*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03
Intercept 0.57 0.26 0.26
Xk country level 0.37*** 0.12 0.14*** 0.05 0.17*** 0.06
Xj individual level 2.97*** 0.04 3.05*** 0.04 2.74*** 0.03




Notes: N¼ 429,510 trust evaluations; SE, standard error.
aIn a model estimating effects from both fractionalization and polarization – as proposed in conflict literature
by, for example, Alesina et al. (2003), Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) and Reynal-Querol (2002) –
estimated standard errors inflate, indicating multicollinearity. Therefore, only fractionalization is included as
a predictor, giving the same results as when polarization measures are included.
***p< .001; **p< .01; *p< .05.
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trusting another population.With the fractionalization index at its lowest score and all
other predictors being equal (at their average standardized value of 0, or the value of 0
for the dummy variables), the probability of trusting another population is 44 percent,
whereas at the highest level of fractionalization the trust probability is estimated at 74
percent. We have to refute the ethnic concentration hypothesis as well, because the
concentration of ethnic migrants in a country has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence. Finally, the
ethnic competition hypothesis was refuted. A larger share of a speciﬁc out-group does
not result in lower levels of trust, as was predicted, but it is not related to trust in this
multiple logistic regression model.
The other fractionalization hypothesis we formulated concerned income
inequality. Here we do ﬁnd the expected relation: a larger Gini coeﬃcient – indi-
cating greater inequality – is associated with a population less likely to trust other
populations. At the highest income inequality, trust rates are predicted to be 44
percent; at the lowest income inequality, trust in other populations is 63 percent.
The cultural and geographical distance hypotheses are also supported by our
results, conﬁrming the previous ﬁndings of Delhey (2007a). In model 2, we note
that the sharing of language and religion increases the levels of inter-population
trust. When language and religion are not shared, with everything else being con-
stant, the probability of trusting another population is equal to the intercept prob-
ability of 56 percent. When countries share their language, the probability of
trusting the other country’s population increases to 67 percent. When religion is
also shared, inter-population trust increases further to 76 percent. We also ﬁnd
evidence to support the hypothesis that countries at a greater distance are trusted
less. In comparison with the other discussed eﬀects, its size is rather small. At the
shortest distance, trust is estimated to be 58 percent, whereas at the greatest dis-
tance, trust decreases to 54 percent. Neighbouring countries do not attract more
trust. Moreover, shared EU membership increases reciprocal trust as well.
We also included the control variables in the second model. Most of them turned
out to be related to trust, as found in previous research, although some predictors were
insigniﬁcant. Of the country characteristics, GDP and the Public Institutions Index do
not signiﬁcantly contribute in explaining levels of trust. The same characteristics of the
target population do turn out to aﬀect the levels of trust in a foreign population. As
formulated by Delhey (2007a), both the economic and the political prestige of a coun-
try increase the levels of trust in the populations of these countries. When countries
have both a low GDP and a low Public Institutions Index – everything else being
constant – trust in their population is estimated to be 27 percent. At the highest GDP
and Public Institutions Index, trust is estimated to be as high as 87 percent.
Individual-level characteristics inﬂuence trust in other populations as well, and
are in line with ﬁndings from previous research. Age and education have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on trust in other populations. The older people are, the less trust they have in
other populations; and, the higher the education, the more trust people have. It is
argued that people with higher education have a more tolerant and universal view of
cultures and cultural diﬀerences (Pinxten, 2002). Our result with respect to educa-
tional level leads to the same conclusion. The more highly educated are estimated to
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trust other populations in 70 percent of the evaluations. Those with lower education
are predicted to have trust in 43 percent of the evaluations, all other predictors being
equal. Lastly, men have a higher level of trust in populations from other countries,
but the diﬀerences between the genders are limited to 3 percentage points.
With the ﬁndings presented in model 3 we evaluate the hypothesis that unfa-
miliarity with a population decreases trust and we assess whether this unfamiliarity
mediates the eﬀects of cultural and geographical distance. There is a strong eﬀect of
unfamiliarity with a population. The less fellow citizens are familiar with a speciﬁc
population, the lower the levels of trust respondents have in that population. This
ﬁnding supports our hypothesis. Moreover, we see that the eﬀect of cultural dis-
tance diminishes when the unfamiliarity measurement is included in the model. The
eﬀect of language distance decreases from .46 to .37. The eﬀect of religious dis-
tance, however, remains unchanged. The eﬀects of geographical distance even
reverse. Given the relative familiarity with populations nearby, we could have
expected those populations to be trusted more. Consequently, we ﬁnd now –
given familiarity with a population – that populations at a short geographical
distance and neighbouring countries are less trusted. Moreover, the eﬀect of
shared EU membership is interpreted as familiarity with the population. Based
on these ﬁndings the mediation hypothesis is supported. Also, the positive eﬀects
of fractionalization and the percentage of the speciﬁc target population in the
country are partly mediated by levels of unfamiliarity. The higher the fractionali-
zation, the lower the levels of unfamiliarity with other populations and, conse-
quently, the higher the levels of trust. A comparable interpretation goes for the
presence of speciﬁc target populations. The higher their relative numbers, the more
likely the populations are known; which makes them less prone to be distrusted.
Given their familiarity, however, we see that the eﬀect of the presence of speciﬁc
out-groups is negative and in accordance with our hypothesis. So, when controlled
for familiarity, a larger presence of an out-group induces higher levels of distrust,
which we interpreted in terms of a perceived threat.
Trust in respondents’ own population
In Table 3, we present the results of the analyses to explain trust in respondents’
own population. First, we again estimated the null model, presenting the variance
of trust among countries. The level 2 variance estimation is highly signiﬁcant,
implying that countries vary in the extent to which their populations trust them-
selves. The intra-class correlation shows 33 percent of the variance being accounted
for by the country level. In the ﬁrst model, the bivariate relations between ethnic
diversity measures and levels of trust are given. The eﬀects are, however, too small
to reach signiﬁcance. Both ethnic fractionalization and polarization are positively
associated with levels of trust, as is ethnic concentration. We ﬁnd no evidence for
Putnam’s (2007) hypothesis that people have less trust in their own ethnic group
when they live in a more ethnically diverse context. The only country characteristic
that inﬂuences trust in their own population is income inequality. Diversity in
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terms of income inequality in a country shows a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on trust
in their own group. GDP and the Public Institutions Index again go in the expected
direction, but do not reach signiﬁcance.
Regarding the eﬀects of individual characteristics, none has an eﬀect on trusting
their own population comparable to the eﬀect on trusting other populations. Even
with such a large data set, none of the predictors turned out to be signiﬁcant. The
strong positive eﬀect of education on trusting other populations is absent when it
comes to trusting one’s own population.
Conclusion and discussion
Our ﬁndings are contrary to Putnam’s hypothesis on the eﬀects of diversity on
social trust. Foreign populations, as well as one’s own population, are unlikely to
be distrusted when people live in a more ethnically diverse country. We come to
Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression parameters (logits) predicting trust in their own
population
Model 0 Model 1 Bivariate relations Model 2
b SE b SE b SE
Own country characteristics
Ethnic fractionalization 0.25 0.29 –0.05 0.32
Ethnic polarizationa 0.21 0.28
Percentage of foreigners 0.52 0.33 0.51 0.44
Income inequality –0.54** 0.24
GDP 0.02 0.44






Xj Country level 1.61*** 0.54 0.64*** 0.22




Notes: N¼ 18,534 respondents evaluating their own population; SE, standard error.
aIn a model estimating effects from both fractionalization and polarization – as proposed in conflict literature
by, for example, Alesina et al. (2003), Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) and Reynal-Querol (2002) –
estimated standard errors inflate, indicating multicollinearity. Therefore, only fractionalization is included as
a predictor, giving the same results as when polarization measures are included.
***p< .001; **p< .01; *p< .05.
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this conclusion independently of the use of a measurement of ethnic diversity, by
using a measurement of either fractionalization, polarization or ethnic concentra-
tion. We even found that, in ethnically more fractionalized or polarized European
societies, populations trust other European populations more. Moreover,
Europeans do not have less trust in other European populations when their pres-
ence is larger in the country of the trust-giver. We do, however, ﬁnd negative eﬀects
of diversity. More cultural diversity within the EU decreases levels of trust.
According to our results, cultural distance between two populations aﬀects
mutual trust between those populations. People are more likely to trust popula-
tions with similar languages and the same religion. The adage ‘unknown is unloved’
is supported by our ﬁndings. We show that the negative eﬀects of language distance
and geographical distance and the positive eﬀects of fractionalization are partly
mediated by the level of familiarity with a particular population. We tentatively
conclude that initially low levels of trust are overcome when people become more
familiarized with other populations and they get accustomed to living together in
the European countries. This result is in line with contact theory (Allport, 1954;
Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006): people have more positive attitudes towards other
groups when there is more contact directly or indirectly with the other group.
These ﬁndings also agree with the conclusions of Jones and Van der Bijl (2004)
in explaining attitudes to the EU accession of speciﬁc countries. Thus, intra-EU
migration seems to be a stimulus for higher levels of trust among EU populations.
Controlling for the level of familiarity, there is, however, a negative eﬀect of the
presence of speciﬁc out-groups, which we interpret as the ethnic competition eﬀect.
Delhey (2007b) also found that the initially positive relationship between share of a
speciﬁc out-group and trust turned negative under the control of other character-
istics – although these eﬀects did not reach signiﬁcance.
Next to the importance of ethnic diversity and cultural diﬀerences between
populations, we ﬁnd that the political and economic prestige (Delhey, 2007a) of
the country in which people put their trust are relevant. Populations from countries
with more favourable public institutional arrangements, as well as those from
richer countries, are trusted more.
Trust in their own population reaches very high levels in the European coun-
tries, with a maximum of 100 percent among the Austrians. Cross-national diﬀer-
ences in trust in their own population are explained only by the level of income
inequality. This predictor turned out to be the only signiﬁcant one in explaining
both trust in other populations and trust in their own population. Greater income
inequality in the country of the trust-giver decreases trust, which is in line with our
expectation that greater heterogeneity decreases the level of trust. The replication
of this eﬀect in the present and in previous research (Gesthuizen et al., 2009;
Putnam, 2007; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005) shows that economic inequalities
might be stronger predictors of trust than ethnic diversity.
An interesting ﬁnding at the individual level is that the eﬀect of educational
attainment on trusting other populations was diﬀerent from the eﬀect on trusting
one’s own population. The higher the education, the greater the trust in foreign
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populations, but education turned out not to increase the level of trust in one’s own
population.
In the literature on the eﬀects of ethnic diversity on all kinds of outcomes, ethnic
fractionalization, ethnic polarization and ethnic concentration are distinguished.
For the European context, we found that ethnic fractionalization and polarization
are so strongly correlated that they cannot be included in models without causing
multicollinearity. Polarization and fractionalization are, however, yet to be disen-
tangled from ethnic concentration – both theoretically and empirically. We showed
that ethnic concentration had less impact on trust evaluations than fractionaliza-
tion or polarization. We have to keep in mind though that, without a European
standard on migrants and ethnic groups, this kind of research needs to be repli-
cated to corroborate the empirical ﬁndings.
We ﬁnally stress that, with more than 400,000 judgements of trust from respon-
dents in 20 countries evaluating their trust in 28 EU populations, our ﬁndings show
that ethnic diversity does not inﬂuence inter-EU trust negatively. We even found
evidence that an ethnically diverse composition has a positive eﬀect on trust. It is
highly recommended that future studies of trust at diﬀerent levels – country,
region, municipality and neighbourhood – account not only for individual and
contextual characteristics but for target group characteristics as well.
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